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Preemption: a Judicial Headache
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1947 the United States Congress passed the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act),' setting forth basic federal labor
policy in the noncarrier field.2 The various states, of course, already
had statutes that dealt with different aspects of labor-management rela-
tions. Thus the question arose: to what extent did the federal labor
laws pre-empt those of the states? This article will outline judicial at-
tempts to respond to that question, analyze the ultimate answer given
by the Supreme Court and comment on the present status of the pre-
emption doctrine.
I1. EARLY DEVELOPMENT
The right of the federal government to exclude state law in this area
derives from the supremacy clause3 of the Constitution. Also, the cases
concerning the pre-emption problem involve industries that effect com-
merce,4 therefore where there is no direct or indirect connection with
interstate commerce, state power remains unaffected by the federal
pre-emption doctrine.
Three types of activities under the NLRA have directly confronted
this doctrine:
1. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970)) hereinafter
cited as LMRA .
2. The initial federal labor laws were passed to police railroad disputes. See The
Arbitration Act, 25 Stat. 501 (1888); Endman Act, 30 Stat. 424 (1898); The Newlands
Act, 38 Stat. 103 (1913); Adamson Act, 39 Stat. 721 (1916); Title III of The
Transportation Act (Esch-Cummins Law), 41 Stat. 456 (1920); The Railroad Labor Act
of 1926, 45 U.S.C. § 151-63, became the basic legislation for the railroads and in 1936
was extended to cover interstate air carriers. In the noncarrier field the initial effort of
the federal government was the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), §H 6, 20; 15 U.S.C. §
17. It attempted to free unions of state injunctive procedures and antitrust actions, but
was largely ineffective. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932); 29 U.S.C. 9H
101-15, deprived federal courts of the power to issue labor injunctions and declared that
the individual should have full freedom of association and self-organization. The
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) was enacted in 1935, and the statute
declared that the policy of the United States was to encourage collective bargaining and
full freedom of worker self-organization. 49 Stat. 449, as amended by 61 Stat. 136 and
73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. See also
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 153,
158-60, 164, 187 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
4. See NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlain Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346
U.S. 482 (1953); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951).
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(1) Protected activities under Section 7, which guarantee employ-
ees "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . ..
Accordingly, Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of Section 7 rights.' Section 8(a)(1) would therefore prevent
employers from retaliating against employees engaged in "concerted
activities" under Section 7.
(2) Prohibited activities under Section 8 (b), which outlawed certain
unfair union practices, including the refusal to bargain collectively with
an employer, forcing others to cease doing business with the employer,
and causing an employer to discriminate against an employee for non-
membership in a union.
(3) Activities that are neither protected under Section 7 and Section
8(a)(1) nor prohibited under Section 8(b), such as mass picketing,
threats, violence, and related actions.
In Hill v. Florida" the Court had held that a state may not impose a
licensing and reporting requirement on union business agents and labor
organizations, and enforce it by an injunction against the exercise of
federally established collective bargaining rights. The federal law was
deemed the primary substantive law because of the supremacy clause.
Using this same rationale the Court ruled that state law could not be
used to restrict employees' exercise of the right to engage in "concerted
activities", thus the state could not interfere with peaceful primary
strikes and picketing in support of normal collective bargaining objec-
tives.9 In general, protected activities under Section 7 and Section 8 (a)
(1) were given an early exemption from state interference.
Prohibited activities received the same exemption, but through some-
what different means. In Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd.10 the Court ruled that the State of Wisconsin
could not grant remedies for employer conduct that violated local law
when the same conduct was also an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA. A similar situation arose in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776,11
except in that case the unfair labor practice was unlawful picketing by a
5. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
8. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
9. Street Emp. Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
10. 338 U.S. 953 (1950), rev'g per curiam 255 Wis. 285, 38 N.W.2d 688 (1949).
11. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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union. It was held that a state court could not enjoin peaceful picketing
that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB to prevent unfair labor
practices, even if the state court was applying a substantive rule of law
identical to the federal law. In short, the NLRA pre-empted similar
state law. In an often quoted passage from Garner the Court stated:
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform appli-
cation of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and con-
flicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes
toward labor controversies .... 12
The Supreme Court thus stated its belief that the use of a variety of
procedures and courts would lead to conflicting results, even though
based upon the same substantive law. State courts were also not allowed
to proceed with state remedies pending action by the NLRB, 1 and it
made no difference whether the state law was regulatory in nature or con-
cerned with the adjudication of private rights. 4
The most significant potential conflict feared by the Court was proba-
bly in the area of remedies. States can order temporary injunctions
more quickly than the NLRB; and since the LMiRA authorizes only
preventive relief (except for specific union unfair labor practices), 15 a
state remedy in the form of damages would definitely conflict with the
federal policy. The Court thus deemed it in the best interest of all con-
cerned to let the federal administrative body handle such matters.
Jurisdiction problems of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction and
federal pre-emption remain where state law covers an activity neither
protected by Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) nor prohibited by Section 8(b),
e.g. "quickie strikes,"' 6 slow-downs' 7 and some attacks upon the em-
ployers' product.' 8
In International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board9 (the Briggs-Stratton case) the union called unannounced meet-
ings during working hours, which the members would leave work to
attend, while collective negotiations were in process. The Wisconsin
12. Id. at 490-9 1.
13. See Building Trades Council v. Kinard Const. Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954), rev'g
per curiam 258 Ala. 500, 64 So. 2d 400 (1953).
14. 346 U.S. at 500-01.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
16. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S.-245
(1949).
17. See Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 336-39 (1950); Phelps Dodge Copper
Prod. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 367-69 (1952).
18. See, e.g., NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (discharge of
employees for attacking the quality of the employer's television broadcasts not an unfair
labor practice).
19. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
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Employment Relations Board ordered the union to cease and desist. The
Supreme Court reviewed the language of § 7 of NLRA, decided that the
conduct was neither protected nor prohibited, and held, five to four, that
the state could exert jurisdiction over this area, even though the NLRB
had jurisdiction over other areas of labor-management relations involv-
ing Briggs-Stratton (the employer).
The Court saw no conflict between federal and state law, stating
that the NLRB had "no authority either to investigate, approve or
forbid the union conduct in question. This conduct is governable by
the state or it is entirely ungoverned. ' '20  Thus, the impression was left
that if Congress had not expressly exerted authority over labor activities,
those activities were to be governed by the states.
In International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales,21 the re-
spondent (Gonzales) claimed that he had been unlawfully expelled
from his union and brought suit in the Superior Court of California for
restoration of membership and damages. The court ordered reinstate-
ment and awarded him back wages and damages for physical and
mental suffering. On appeal, the petitioners did not argue that Cali-
fornia did not have the power to reinstate him, but did argue that the
.state could not award damages. The Supreme Court agreed that the
state could reinstate Gonzales:
As Garner v. Teamsters Union . . . could not avoid deciding, the
Taft-Hartley Act undoubtedly carries implications of exclusive fed-
eral authority. Congress withdrew from the States much that had
therefore rested with them.. But the other half of what was pro-
nounced in Garner-that the Act leaves much to the states,--is
no less important. 22
The Court also held that the state could award the damages, noting
that there was no federal law protecting union members from arbitrary
conduct by unions. If federal law was to prevail, the Court argued,
the wrongfully ousted union member would be denied restoration of
union rights. Also, since the Court had previously held that certain
state causes of action sounding in tort are not displaced 23 simply because
there is a possible, but remote, chance of an NLRB proceeding, it had
little difficulty in finding that a contract right should also not be dis-
placed when a conflict with federal policy was remotely possible. As
the Court stated:
The possibility of conflict from the court's award of damages in the
present case is no greater than from its order that respondent be re-
20. 336 U.S. at 254.
21. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
22. Id. at 619.
23. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
361
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stored to membership. In either case the potential conflict is too
contingent, too remotely related to the public interest expressed in
the Taft-Hartley Act, to justify depriving state courts of jurisdiction
to vindicate the personal rights of an ousted union member.24
The Briggs-Stratton and Gonzales cases seem to conflict with Garner.
The former cases imply that activities not claimed by the federal policy
are to be governed by the states exclusively, or at least until Congress
decides that the NLRA should be amended to include them. Garner, on
the other hand, implies that federal law should pre-empt state law in
such areas because the NLRB would be in a better position to weigh the
delicate balance between labor, management and the public interest.
After all, the Garner decision was based on the fear of potential con-
flict between different courts using the same law. However, the con-
fusion that existed was soon to be cleared up, or so the Court thought.
III. THE GARMON DECISION
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon2 5 the petitioning
unions demanded that the employer retain only those workers who
were already members of the unions or who applied for membership
within thirty days. When the respondent employer refused, the unions
began peacefully picketing his place of business. The respondent
brought an action in the California Superior Court asking for an injunc-
tion and damages. Upon finding that the unions' sole purpose was to
compel execution of the proposed contract, and not to educate and per-
suade the employees to become members, the trial court granted the in-
junctions and awarded $1,000 in damages.
The respondents had also started a representation proceeding before
the NLRB, but the Regional Director had declined jurisdiction, presum-
ably because the amount of interstate commerce did not meet NLRB
standards.2 Basically because the NLRB had declined jurisdiction, the
California Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Superior Court
and held that the state had power over the dispute.27
' On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, heard with two
companion cases,28 the Court held that the refusal of the NLRB to assert
jurisdiction did not give the state power over activities it otherwise
' 24. 356 U.S. at 621.
25. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
26. id. at 238; see NLRB Press Release No. R-576, Oct. 2, 1958.
27. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473
(1958).
28. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957) and Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
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would be pre-empted from regulating.2 9 Therefore, the Court reversed
the injunction but remanded to*the state court for consideration of the
issue of damages.3 0 The California court sustained the award of dam-
ages,3 and another writ of certiorari was granted. 2
The question presented was whether state courts could award dam-
ages arising from conduct which they did not have the power to enjoin.
The Court noted that when state powers interfered with clearly indicat-
ed federal policy, it was necessary to preclude state action, except in
areas of peripheral concern33 to the LMRA. If it be unclear whether a
particular activity is protected by Sections 7 and 8(b)(1) or prohibited
by Section 8(b)(2), or outside both of these sections, the NLRB should
first decide this issue:
It is not for us to decide whether the National Labor Relations Board
would have or should have, decided these questions in the same man-
ner (as the California courts). When an activity is arguably subject to
§ 7 or § 8 of the Act, the state (courts) as well as the federal courts
must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board if the danger of state interference with the National policy
is to be averted.8 4 (emphasis added)
Therefore,/since the NLRB had not decided the status of the
conduct by the union, and since the conduct was arguably within
the realm of Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act, the state's jurisdiction
to award damages was pre-empted. Distinguishing earlier decisions that
allowed states to award damages for conduct marked by violence 35 and
imminent threats to the public order,36 and that allowed state injunctions
of such activity,37 the majority opinion stated that in those decisions a
compelling state interest was present that was paramount to federal
policy. In Garmon there was no compelling state interest; therefore,
the state was pre-empted.
Garmon was not consistent with Briggs-Stratton (state law to control
conduct neither protected nor prohibited by federal regulation) because
it did not matter whether the conduct was protected, prohibited, or
neither, and the Court also refused to make that determination itself.
29. 353 U.S. 10 (1957). This holding was repealed by 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2)
(1970).
30. 353 U.S. 29 (1957).
31. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 310 P.2d 473
(1958).
32. 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
33. International Assoc. of Mach. v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
34. San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
35. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
36. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
37. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266
(1956).
363
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If it arguably fell within the power of the NLRB, state law was pre-
empted. The Garner decision (emphasizing the primary jurisdiction of
federal policy because of the need to avoid potential conflicts) is more
closely aligned. As the Court stated:
... The governing consideration is that to allow the States to control
activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too
great a danger of conflict with national labor policy. 38
In a concurring opinion Justices Harlan, Clark, Whittaker and Stew-
art wanted to narrow the ruling to hold that since the activity could
fairly be considered protected under the Taft-Hartley Act (thus a de-
termination made by the Court), the state action should be precluded
until the NLRB has made a contrary decision.39 These justices also
argued that the state should have power to award damages for con-
duct prohibited by the NLRA, and to regulate activities neither arguably
protected nor actually prohibited by the NLRA.
Nevertheless, because the Garmon formula was easily applied by the
courts and sounded like "good hornbook law,"4 it was regarded as the
final word in the question of federal pre-emption of the field of strikes,
boycotts, and picketing.4 The formula did not, however, decide
whether states could control activities that clearly are neither protected
nor prohibited by the NLRA.
IV. THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE SINCE Garmon
Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton42 presented the issue of whether a
state could apply its laws in areas that might upset the congressional
balance between labor-management relations when the activities to be
regulated were neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited by the
NLRA. The Court held that the state could not exert such power.
Local 20 represented employees of Morton. During a strike over
terms of a new collective bargaining agreement, the union persuaded
one of Morton's customers to discontinue business with Morton during
the strike. No threats were made to the customer, so the activity to
persuade him to boycott was not even arguably an unfair labor practice
under 8(b) ;43 and the union apparently agreed that it was not pro-
tected by Section 7. However, under Ohio law, the activity was illegal,
and the lower federal court awarded damages.
The Supreme Court noted that the activity of non-coercive self-help
38. 359 U.S. at 246.
39. Id. at 249.
40. Cox, Labor Law Pre-emption Revisited, 85 HAiV. L. REV. 1337, 1350 (1972).
41. Id.
42. 377 U.S. 252, 256-61 (1964).
43. See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
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was not within the Garmon rule, but added that such activity had been
permitted by federal law,44 and was part of the balance struck by Con-
gress between competing interests in the labor relations field."' It went
on to state:
If the Ohio law of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe
the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but did not
proscribe when it enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to
frustrate the congressional determination, to leave this weapon of
self-help available, and to upset -the balance of power between labor
and management expressed in our national labor policy. 'For a
state to impinge on 'the -area of labor combat designed to be free is
quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were
to declare picketing free for the purposes or by methods which the
federal Act prohibits.' (Citation Omitted) 46
But the Court knew from the legislative history of the 1959 amend-
ments to the NLRA17 that Congress had decided to allow noncoercive
persuasion of customers in a labor dispute.48 Other activities were not
as easily known, but the basic principle was that states should not upset
the balance of freedom and restraint that Congress established for self-
organization and collective bargaining.
The Garmon rule subsequently became susceptible to exceptions in
areas that were arguably protected or arguably prohibited. Since the
NRLA prohibits mass picketing and forceful coercion,4 9 under the
Garmon rule the NLRB should have exclusive jurisdiction of noncoer-
cive activity, but it does not. States can order compensatory and
punitive damages5" and issue injunctions. 51 States can hear claims for
alleged breach of a labor contract even though an unfair labor practice
may be asserted.52  They can also issue remedies for breach of the
union bargaining representative's violation of the duty of fair representa-
tion even though the claim could have been brought before the NLRB. 53
In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers5 4 a libel action against a labor
union was allowed to stand, without considering whether the statement
was prohibited under Section 7 or Section 8(a)(1). Similarly, Morton
44. Carpenters Local 1976 v. Labor Board, 357 U.S. 93, 99 (1958).
45. See Electrical Local 761 v. Labor Board, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1960).
46. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964).
47. See generally Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, 44 MINN. L REv. 257 (1959).
48. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970).
50. United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
51. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
52. International Harv. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962); Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
53. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177-88 (1967).
54. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
365
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revealed that federal law will pre-empt state authority in areas that are
neither protected nor prohibited, i.e., areas that had previously been
thought to be controlled by the states.55 So the Garmon rule hardly
seemed ironclad.
In Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Aridne Shipping Co.56 the Garmon
rule was re-evaluated and doubts still lingered when the decision was
announced. The Court declared that the state was pre-empted of juris-
diction to enjoin a peaceful strike protesting substandard wages paid
American longshoremen who worked on foreign ships in Florida ports.
In Justice White's concurring opinion he stated:
So long as employers are effectively denied determinations by the
NLRB as to whether 'arguably protected' picketing is actually pro-
tected except when an employer is willing to threaten or use force
to deal with picketing, I would hold that only labor activity deter-
mined to be actually, rather than arguably, protected under federal
law should be immune from state judicial control. To this extent
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (Citation Omitted),
should be reconsidered. 57
The Justice had realized a basic flaw of Garmon-the remedy. Al-
though the rule prevents conflicts between state and federal authority,
and prevents potential judicial errors in determining what activity is and
what is and what is not within Section 7 and 8, it does not allow relief in
another forum or guarantee a timely NLRB, ruling to the party who may
be entitled to relief. Where activity is arguably protected within Sec-
tions 7 and 8, the employer is effectively barred from a swift determina-
tion, and is doomed to suffer the consequences of the activity even
though the conduct may in fact be outside the realm of Sections 7 and
8(a)(1). By the time the NLRB has decided who should exercise ju-
risdiction, itself or the state, the relief may be too late.
This matter reached the boiling point in Amalgamated Association of
Street Employees v. Lockridge.58  Lockridge was a Greyhound bus
driver and long time union member. He failed to pay his monthly dues
on Oct. 1, 1959. On November 2, Amalgamated requested that Grey-
hound dismiss Lockridge in accordance with a union shop clause,5 9 and
Greyhound promptly discharged him. On November 10 Lockridge
paid his October and November dues.
Although Lockridge could have filed an unfair labor practice charge
against both Greyhound and Amalgamated, because a union is prohibit-
55. See note 20 supra.
56. 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
57. Id. at 202.
58. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
59. Id. at 277-78.
9
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ed from seeking an employee's discharge because he is not a union
member,60 and the employer is prohibited from discharging him upon
the union's request, 61 he chose instead to sue Amalgamated in the state
court of Idaho. It was suggested that this was done because a similar
charge filed by a Greyhound employee had been rebuffed by the NLRB
Regional Director. 2 The state court found a breach of contract by
Amalgamated, ordered Lockridge reinstated to membership in the un-
ion, restored his seniority rights with Greyhound, and ordered compen-
sation for loss of wages.6"
The Supreme Court reversed. It stated that the Garmon rule of
"arguably protected or prohibited" activity should apply, even though
this case involved a member-union contest and Garmon involved labor-
management relations. Gonzales 4 was not overruled by the Court, but
that case had stated:
...,the protection of union members in their rights as members from
arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been under-
taken by federal law, and indeed the assertion of any such power has
been expressly denied.. . . Thus, to preclude a state court from
exerting its traditional jurisdiction to determine and enforce the rights
of union membership would in many cases leave an unjustly ousted
member without remedy for the restoration of his important union
rights. Such a drastic result, on the remote possibility of some en-
tanglement with the Board's enforcement of the national policy, would
require a more compelling indication of congressional will than can
be found in the interstices of the Taft-Hartley Act.65
Justice Harlan attempted to explain this anomaly on the basis that
Gonzales only required the state court to analyze the union's constitution
and by-laws, but Lockridge required the state to construe the union
security clause, 6 "a matter as to which . . . federal concern is
pervasive. ... . One commentator has suggested that this rationale
fails for two reasons: (1) state and federal courts are as competent as
the NLRB to interpret the security clause, and (2) in order to interpret
the clause it is necessary to look back to the constitution and by-laws to
which the clause refers.6
8
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1970).
62. 403 U.S. at 280, n.3.
63. Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d
719 (1969).
64. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
65. Id. at 620.
66. 403 U.S. at 296.
67. Id.
68. See Cox, supra note 42, at 1376.
367
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Another commentator has viewed the unavailability of remedial mea-
sures not as a gap or failing that the states may redress, but as "a
conscious congressional judgment, creating a balance which state 'sup-
plementation' may not upset", 9 and states that Chief Justice Warren's
dissent (arguing against the availability of state relief) in Gonzales is
now the prevailing view."0
It should be remembered that the rationale behind the Garmon rule is
the attempt to avoid state interference with a national plan for balancing
the seperate interests of labor, management and the public. To say that
a breach of contract rights between a union and a union member will
upset that balance, just because the activity is arguably within the
province of the national labor laws, seems harsh and unfair especially
since Lockridge would appear to apply not only to arguably prohibited
activity but also to activity that is arguably protected under Section 7.
Thus, where the activity is arguably protected, for the petitioner to get a
hearing before the Board he would have to commit an unfair labor
practice.71 An example of this situation would arise where a union is
engaged in a peaceful strike not prohibited by Section 8. The state
court cannot enjoin the activity72 as a trespass because it is arguably
protected by Section 7. There is no unfair labor practice; therefore, the
only way to get a Board ruling is to expel the strikers, force them to file
an unfair labor practice and raise the status of picketing as a defense.7
V. CONCLUSION
The Lockridge decision reaffirmed the arguably protected or prohib-
ited rule of Garmon, but it also revealed the inequities and doubts that
surround the rule. Professor Archibald Cox has suggested that
Garmon's basic premise is correct, that states should be pre-empted
when there is a possibility of interference with national labor policy, but'
he wants the Court to amend Garmon and expand on the theory of
Morton74 which would preclude state court jurisdiction in areas where
Congress intended a free exchange between labor and management,
even though such is neither protected nor prohibited by Sections 7 and
8.
Cox argues that Congress developed the labor law within the larger
body of state law "creating rights of property, bodily security, and
.69. Lesnick, Pre-emption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 469, 477 (1972).
70. Id.
71. See 403 U.S. 274, 326 (1971) (White, dissenting).
72. But see Taggart v. Weinackers, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
73. See Come, Federal Pre-emption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Prob-
lems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435, 1444 (1970).
74. See Cox, supra note 40, at 1335.
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personality (sic), preserving public order, and promoting public health
and welfare. '75  These laws apply to the public in general without
regard to the status of the individual (i.e. employer, union, or employ-
ee), and do not interfere with federal labor policy because they are not
concerned with balancing special interests. He states:
The likelihood that the collateral impact of such laws upon manage-
ment or labor will upset the national balance is small enough to
permit their operation unless interference with a specific federal right
can be affirmatively demonstrated.76 (emphasis added)
Professor Cox's formula deserves significant analysis by the Court, as
should any theory that can aid in the interpretation of the pre-emption
doctrine. Under the present rule, unless one of the limited exceptions
applies, the states will continue to be precluded from areas in which the
potential of interference is remote. However, the basic premise of
Garmon and of all federal legislation is the postulate that the state
courts should be pre-empted only where there is a serious threat of con-
flict with national policy. It was and is assumed that a national law can
more adequately balance the delicate interplay between competing
forces in labor relations, and do so for the betterment of society as a
whole. But when there is no absolute need for federal intervention, a
rule that imposes it on a theory of potential interference is a harmful
rule. It does not better society. It does not balance interests in a fair
manner.
Garmon left to the states the power to regulate any matter of "peri-
pheral concern" to the NLRA or that conduct that touches interests
"deeply rooted in local feeling or responsibility." 77  As of now those
terms have not been fully defined by the Court. Hopefully, when
judicial attempts are made to expound on them, those phrases will be
given liberal interpretations so that state courts may exercise jurisdiction
over areas of remote potential interference with federal labor law.
LEONARD T. JERNIGAN, JR.
75. Id. at 1356.
76. Id. at 1345.
77. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
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